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ABSTRACT 
In this paper a logic particularly appropriate for  decision-making applications is 
described. In order to express beliefs, the notion o f  a sentence is replaced by that o f  
an assertion. It is then natural to take the corresponding "'truth value" to be the 
utility associated, as in standard decision theory, with the act of  making the 
assertion, and connectives become ordinary real-valued functions. The representa- 
tion of  decision-making rules (in the sense o f  expert systems) as assertions i studied, 
and it is shown that common but moderately sophisticated rules (including degrees 
of  belief and limiting conditions) admit a very simple representation i volving only 
linear functions. The structure o f  the corresponding formal logic in which variables 
are used to denote arbitrary assertions i briefly described. It turns out that this logic 
admits a deductive method closely analogous to Robinson's method o f  resolution. 
Uging this method, a problem in deduction in the logic o f  assertions becomes a
problem in linear programming, and the assertional form of  resolution coincides 
with Fourier's method for  solving such problems. 
KEYWORDS: decision theory, probabil ity, utility, logic, belief, fuzzy ,  
assertion, resolution 
INTRODUCTION 
The formal language and logic described here has been outlined in two 
previous papers [1, 2]. In the first, a simplified version of an early form of the 
logic was given and the way in which Robinson's resolution principle xtended 
to the new logic was described, and in the second it was shown how the problem 
of reaching a precise interpretation f the notion of grade of membership (in a 
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fuzzy set) leads to the same logic. This paper shows how the same structure 
arises again as the solution to the problem of producing a language for 
expressing the data, reasoning, and conclusions involved in decision making. 
For lack of space and to avoid technicalities, exact mathematical definitions, 
theorems, and proofs are not given. These will be contained in a later paper 
(Giles [3]). 
LOGIC  FOR DECIS ION MAKING 
For application to problems of decision making under uncertainty, classical 
logic has to be modified in two respects. First, orthodox accounts of classical 
logic depend on the notion of absolute truth: It is assumed that to each sentence 
there corresponds a unique truth value; it is sometimes even claimed that the 
meaning of the sentence is given by this truth value. In problems of decision 
making, however, we are concerned with subjective beliefs, so we cannot 
assign a unique truth value to a sentence. Of course, we continue to assume that 
each sentence carries a meaning that is objective in that it is common to (and 
understood by) all persons in the relevant social group--for if this were not the 
case useful communication would be impossible--but we now adopt the 
following more sophisticated understanding of "meaning":  
The meaning of a sentence is given by specifying 
the conditions under which it is true. 
Equivalently, the meaning of a sentence is given by a truth function, which 
attaches to each "state of the world" (or to each "possible world," if you like) a 
truth value, 1 (for true) or 0 (for false). A truth function is thus a function on 12, 
the set of all world states, to the two-element set { 0, 1 } of classical truth values. 
It is convenient to identify each sentence with its truth function. In this way 
logical relations between sentences take the form of mathematical relations 
between these functions, thus permitting the application of ordinary mathemati- 
cal notations and concepts. 
With this understanding we can assume that different persons, or agents, 
never disagree concerning the meaning of sentences; they differ simply in 
respect o their beliefs regarding which "conditions" actually obtain. A truth 
value is now a subjective quantity; it represents an agent's belief about a 
sentence. His complete state of belief is given by the set of all the sentences he 
believes to be true, which we may call his belief set. J
By the semantic properties of the language we mean those properties that 
] In keeping with common practice, I confine my use of personal pronouns tothe male "he" and 
"his." This is purely a matter of convenience and is not intended to connote a purely male world. 
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follow from the meanings (in the sense just explained) of the sentences involved 
and are independent of individual beliefs. These properties are objective, in that 
all agents agree about them. As an example, we say (for any sentences c~ and/3) 
that a IMPLIES/3 iff/3 is true whenever c~ is true (i.e., under any conditions 
under which ~ is true)2; for example, "John is a giant" IMPLIES "John is tall." 
Semantic properties are thus properties that derive from the meanings of the 
words used. Note that ~ IMPLIES /3 iff ~ ___ /3, where the sentences are 
identified with their truth functions and these are ordered "pointwise on f r '  
[i.e., o~ _< /3 means c~(o~) < /3(o~) for every state ~]. 
As a particular kind of semantic property we have the purely logical 
properties, those properties that depend only on the meanings of the 
connectives. As an example, we say 3' is the conjunction, ~and/3, of a and/3 if 
q/is true exactly when both c¢ and/3 are true, in other words, if, regarding a,/3, 
and 3' as truth functions, 3' is the largest function that "underlies" both ~ and/3, 
i.e., if it is the infimum, a A /3, of c~ and /3 in the lattice of all real-valued 
functions on f2. 
The second respect in which classical logic has to be modified is, by now, well 
known. In 1965 Zadeh [4] drew attention to the inadequacies of classical ogic 
that arise from its insistence that (in any particular world state) every sentence is 
either true or false, while in fact hardly any statements occurring in common 
language have this property. In a first attempt o escape the rigidity of classical 
logic, truth values in the interval [0, 1] were admitted. Mathematically, there is 
no problem in this: Lukasiewicz logic and various other logics have the desired 
property. But difficulties arise when one tries to apply the new logic: How does 
one decide whether one's belief is represented by a truth value of 0.6 or 0.7? 
And how is one to interpret such an intermediate ruth value when it arises at the 
conclusion of an application? 
The last question provides a clue. Most, if not all, applications are concerned 
with decision making in one form or another; indeed, from a practical point of 
view the function of the language and its logic is to assist in decision making. So 
what we want is a numerical quantity that can be interpreted as a degree of belief 
and acts like a truth value in the logic but that is also related to decision making. 
Now, decision theory is built on two fundamental concepts, probability and 
utility. Of these, probability is more easily and more naturally related to truth 
value: We just define the truth value or degree of belief of a sentence to be the 
subjective probability of its being true. This route has been well explored in the 
past; moreover, it is closely related to the approach taken in fuzzy set theory 
(see, for instance, Giles [5, 6]). However, it leads to a number of difficulties. 
First, it is limited to the treatment of "testable" sentences, for only if a sentence 
z IMPLIES is thus a binary relation to the metalanguage. Weuse capital letters for such relations. 
IMPLIES should not be confused with the connective implies or if ... then of classical logic. We 
use lowercase bold font for connectives of classical logic. 
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admits a test for truth can we ascribe to it a subjective probability, and for most 
everyday sentences (for instance, "John is tall") such a truth test can be 
introduced only in an arbitrary and unnatural way. Second, there are problems 
with the connectives: If one tries to maintain the probability interpretation for 
compound sentences, then the logic ceases to be truth-functional. For instance, 
the probability of truth of "c~ and/3" is not determined by the probabilities of c~ 
and /3 but depends also on the correlation between them. This essentially 
precludes the possibility of deductive reasoning. On the other hand, if one 
abandons this interpretation, then the meaning of compound sentences becomes 
obscure, only the simplest types of belief can be expressed satisfactorily, and the 
process of deductive reasoning becomes too complicated tobe of practical value. 
In these circumstances it seems reasonable to consider an alternative approach 
in which truth value is related to utility. To see how this might be accomplished, 
let us compare these two concepts. 
In decision theory there is assigned to each act a numerical utility that 
measures the desirability of performing that act. Naturally, this desirability 
depends on the current state of the world. So there is associated with any act a a 
payoff unction fa defined by 
Utility of act a =fa (state of the world) 
Moreover, this payoff function characterizes the act, in that two acts with the 
same payoff function can be identified since they would be equally desirable 
under all circumstances. 
On the other hand, in classical logic (as we have already seen) a sentence s is 
characterized by its truth function f~ given by the equation 
Truth value of sentence s =fs (state of the world) 
Again, the truth function characterizes the sentence, in that it completely 
determines its meaning. 
A comparison of these equations uggests that utility, act, and payoff 
function might in some way correspond to truth value, sentence, and truth 
function. How can we take advantage of this observation? Well, in decision 
making the function of a sentence is to be asserted by some agent at some time. 
In fact, it is the concept of an assertion--which we may think of formally as a 
triple (sentence, agent, time)--rather than that of a sentence per se that is 
important. For, first, it is clear that sentences play a role only insofar as they are 
asserted; and, more important, it is to assertions rather than to sentences that we 
wish to attach truth values, for these truth values are intended to represent 
subjective beliefs, and distinct assertions of the same sentence will usually be 
associated with different degrees of belief. Thus what we really want is not a 
sentential logic but a logic of  assertions. 
The question raised earlier now takes the form: How can we attach a utility to 
an assertion a? In this form the answer is easy: An assertion--unlike a 
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sentence--is itself an act and so already has a utility. Strictly speaking, what we 
are concerned with is the desirability of making the assertion a; this is a natural 
measure of the agent's degree of belief in the assertion. This desirability is given 
(see Giles [2]) by the difference 
Utility of making the assertion - utility of not making the assertion 
We will call this difference, which of course is a function of the current world 
state ~0, the payoff of the assertion a in the state ~0 and denote it a(~0). 
The function a( ) is a real-valued function on f~ that is the analog in the logic 
of assertions of the truth function in classical ogic. Indeed, just as the truth 
function of a sentence c~ tells us for which states an agent would consider the 
sentence to be true, so in the case of an assertion a the payoff function 
determines in which world states the agent will consider the assertion 
"acceptable."  For it follows from the meaning of utility that if the agent 
believes that the actual state of the world is ~0 then he will agree to assert a if and 
only if a(~0) _> 0. However, the payoff function contains more information than 
this: The magnitude of a(~0) gives a measure of how willing [or unwilling, in the 
case a(~0) < 0] the agent is to make the assertion. The value of this feature will 
be seen in the later discussion of compound assertions. In fact, the payoff 
function a( ) of an assertion contains the whole meaning of the assertion. We 
take advantage of this fact by identifying any assertion with its payoff function 
(just as in classical logic each sentence can be identified with its truth function). 
As an immediate consequence of this identification, algebraic operations on 
the real numbers now play the role of connectives for assertions. For instance, if 
a and b are assertions, then expressions uch as 2a, a + b, a /x b, ab, and 
exp (a) denote functions on fl in the obvious way 3 and so can be interpreted as 
assertions. 
We have thus obtained the basis for a new logic in which utilities take over the 
role played by truth values in classical logic. In the next section we shall see how 
this feature gives a precise and practical meaning to the new "truth values" in 
the case of assertions connected with decision-making problems. 
INTERPRETAT ION OF A PAYOFF  FUNCTION 
The concept of a utility function, defined in works on decision theory or game 
theory (see, for instance, Jeffrey [7], Lindley [8], Luce and Raiffa [9], and 
Savage [10]), is based on the notion of preference. It follows from postulates 
3 I.e., with the indicated operations acting "pointwise" on ~. For example, writing c = a + b is 
equivalent tosaying c(to) + a(to) + b(to) for all to E 12. It is interesting toobserve that of the five 
expressions given, only the first three can have an objective meaning; the other two change their 
form when a change is made in the unit of utility. See the beginning of the next section. 
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about preference that utilities can be measured on a numerical scale (though in 
general this cannot be identified with a monetary scale). A scale of utility is 
determined by establishing weighted means between utilities via the consider- 
ation of lotteries--combinations of world states with known probabilities. As a 
result, a utility scale is arbitrary up to an ordering-preserving affine (= inho- 
mogeneous linear) transformation. However, since the payoff that we assign to 
an assertion is the difference of two utilities, a payoff scale for assertions is 
arbitrary only up to a positive scale factor, which we can regard as determined 
by the choice of a unit of utility. 
How can the utility of an assertion be determined? In an abstract way it is clear 
that the payoff for an assertion must have some positive value--otherwise the 
speaker would not have made the assertion--but i  is not so easy to see, in a 
concrete way, how this value arises. A few examples will help. 
EXAMPLE 1. Consider the assertion "John is tall." The person who makes 
this statement will generally receive approval if it turns out that John is tall and 
disapproval if he isn't, these reactions being the stronger the more John's height 
differs from the average. The agent will obtain pleasure (or discomfort) 
proportional to the degree of approval (or disapproval). These feelings constitute 
the payoff. Thus the payoff of the assertion depends primarily on the height of 
John, and a graph giving the payoff as a function of height will have the form 
shown in Figure 1. 
Note that the person who makes the statement emphatically will experience 
more pleasure, or more discomfiture. Thus, emphasis--or what it denotes, 
namely a greater degree of belief on the part of the speaker--is represented by a 
"scaling up" of the payoff values. This ability to represent emphasis constitutes 
an important way in which the new logic provides richer means of expression 
than either classical or fuzzy logic. 
In this example the payoff can be recognized in a qualitative way, but it is not 
at all clear how it could be measured. The same applies to most assertions 
occurring in everyday life. However, when an assertion arises as the conclusion 
of a decision-making process, particularly in a business situation, a direct 
monetary payoff is often apparent. 
EXAMPLE 2. The manager of an insurance company finishes examining the 
application of a client for life insurance and asserts as his conclusion, "Smith's 
application is acceptable." Since his assertion constitutes a decision and leads to 
an action is is associated with a payoff in a very concrete way: The payoff may 
be identified with the profit ( + or - ) that the company makes on the policy. In 
making this identification, we are, of course, equating satisfaction to the 
manager with profit to the company. That this is reasonable is simply an 
expression of the assumption that the manager is a loyal executive. The actual 
payoff will, of course, depend on what happens--more particularly on Smith's 
age at death: If he has a long life, the company will make a profit; if he dies 
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Figure 1. Payoff 7r ( = Utility to the speaker) as a Function of the Height h of John, for 
the Assertion "John is tall" 
soon, through accident or illness, it will experience a loss. We can picture the 
situation by a graph showing payoff against age at death. Note that in this case, 
in contrast o Example 1, the payoff can be measured in "company dollars." 
(We are assuming that in the range concerned the manager's atisfaction is 
proportional to the profit to the company.) 
Note that if the value of the policy is scaled up, say by a factor of 10, then the 
payoff values for the manager's assertion--the ordinates in Figure 2--will all be 
multiplied by this factor, for both the premiums received and the payout on death 
are scaled up in the same ratio. Thus the increased importance of the manager's 
assertion is represented by a scaling up of the payoff function, the same 
mathematical feature that represented emphasis in Example 1. These are two 
manifestations of what we may refer to as the strength of belief of the speaker. 
It is convenient to have a numerical measure of this concept. We shall call it the 
weight of the assertion 4 and define it to be the difference between the greatest 
and least payoff values. 
4 We assume (Giles [3]) that the weight of every assertion is finite. This assumption seems 
reasonable and is mathematically convenient though perhaps not absolutely necessary. Note that any 
constant assertion (one whose payoff unction is a constant) has weight zero. This corresponds tothe 
fact that such an assertion makes no distinction between world states and so cannot express a belief. 
30 5O 
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Figure 2. Payoff 7r as a Function of Age at Death for Manager's Assertion 
"Application is acceptable" 
EXAMPLE 3. A doctor, asked by the insurance company to examine Smith, 
asserts as his conclusion, "Smith is healthy." How can we represent his 
assertion by a payoff function? Well, in this case the doctor is the speaker, so we 
must consider the payoff to the doctor. At first sight this would seem to be 
simply his fee, and indeed if Smith is healthy this is the end of the matter. 
However, if Smith is in fact seriously ill, the doctor lays himself open to the 
displeasure of the insurance company--his reputation will certainly suffer, and 
he may be sued by the company and incur a direct financial oss. With no great 
distortion we can represent the doctor's payoff function in dollars (Figure 3). It 
will range from a small positive fee to a possibly large negative quantity. 
Note that the x axis in Figure 3 has a rather abstract significance. There is no 
natural way in which the "outcome,"  which is a convenient short term for 
"state of the world," can be represented by a point on the axis, and indeed 
health of Smith is not really a numerical quantity. The figure is drawn this way 
simply to provide a "picture" of the payoff function. 
EXAMPLE 4. It will be useful to consider also a variation of the previous 
example. Suppose the doctor instead asserts "Smith is not healthy" (no doubt 




HEALTH OF SMITH 
Figure 3. Payoff 7r as a Function of Health of Smith for Doctor's Assertion "Smith is 
healthy" 
also giving details with which we need not be concerned). If Smith is ill, then the 
doctor gets his fee. If he is in fact well, the doctor will perhaps not be sued, since 
the company experiences no great loss as a result of his misleading report, but 
his reputation will certainly suffer, and he may well lose his status as a 
consultant to the company. We can again assess the payoff in monetary terms 
(Figure 4). 
In Examples 2-4 the assertions considered expressed the conclusion of a 
decision-making process. In decision making, however, we are also concerned 
with assertions that describe the data that are input to the process. Before we can 
consider assertions of this type, however, we must digress briefly to discuss 
belief sets. 
BELIEF SETS 
In the case of classical ogic we defined the belief set of an agent o be the set 
of all sentences the agent believes to be true. The obvious analog of this in the 
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HEALTH OF SMITH 
Figure 4. Payoff 7r as a Function of Health of Smith for Doctor's Assertion "Smith is 
not healthy" 
logic of  assertions is to take the bel ief  set of  an agent to be the set of  all assertions 
that the agent is wil l ing to make. 
Certain properties can be postulated for every bel ief  set S: Let ~t denote the 
payoff  function whose value is 1 for every state w. Then k ~, for any real 
number k, is the constant function whose value is k. In principle, k ~ denotes an 
assertion that yields a guaranteed payoff  k. 5 In v iew of  the meaning of  utility, 
no agent will make this assertion if  k < 0; on the other hand, every agent will 
find it "acceptab le"  i f  k > 0. I f  k = 0 we obtain the zero assertion ~, which 
we assume is acceptable to every agent since no harm can come from asserting 
it. To summarize:  For  any bel ief  set S we have k~ E S if  and only i f  k -> 0. 6 
Next,  i f  a and b are assertions with a E S and a < b (pointwise on 12), then 
surely b ~ S, for the payoff  for b is at least as great as the payoff  for a no matter 
5 It may be doubted whether any form of words could express this assertion, at least in the case k 
> 0, but it is convenient to admit it for mathematical purposes. 
6 Giles [3] does not impose this condition, which leads to a larger class of belief sets. The belief 
sets considered here form a subclass consisting of the "coherent" belief sets. 
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what the outcome is. We shall describe the relation a < b as "a  IMPLIES b" ;  
this is reasonable since it is the analog of the relation a IMPLIES/3, which we 
saw earlier corresponds to the truth-functional relation a _< /3. 
Third, one might be inclined to assume that if a E S and b E S, then also a + 
b E S, for the payoff for a + b is by definition the sum of the payoffs for a and 
b. 7 But such an assumption would be unwise, for it would entail that if a E S 
then S contains 2a and, by induction, na for every positive integer n, which is 
tantamount to saying that if one is willing to make an assertion then one should 
be willing to assert it with arbitrarily great emphasis. Although this claim is 
supported by the principles of Bayesian statistics, it is not in accord with real 
life, and it is not mathematically necessary for the useful development of the 
theory. Moreover, to accept it would entail losing the ability to represent 
emphasis (or strength of belief), which is a valuable function of the language of 
assertions, as we shall see. 
A weaker assumption, which we shall adopt, is that S is closed under convex 
combinations (weighted means); i.e., i fa  and b are in S then so also is Xa + (1 
- )x)b, for every X between 0 and 1. To see the justification for this, consider 
the case X = 1/2. By the definition of utility, the payoff for the assertion (a + 
b)/2 coincides with that assumed by an agent who agrees to assert either a or b 
according to the result of the flip of a coin. Consequently, (a + b)/2 should 
surely be acceptable if both a and b are. A similar argument applies to any value 
of X. 
Apart from the technical requirement of topological closure, these are all the 
properties we demand of a belief set. 
Using the notion of a belief set we can give a precise definition of the degree 
of belief of an agent in an assertion. Let a be an assertion. We have seen that for 
any number k >_ O, ka represents the assertion a made with a degree of emphasis 
k. For some degrees of emphasis (certainly for k = 0) the agent will find the 
assertion acceptable. We say his degree of belief in a is the greatest emphasis 
with which he is prepared to assert a: i.e., 
Degree of belief in a=sup{k  : ka E S, k>0}.  
Since we are assuming that ~) E S, the degree of belief is never less than zero. It 
will be infinity if ka E S for every positive number k. We then say the agent has 
perfect belief in a. 
PAYOFF FUNCTIONS FOR INPUT ASSERTIONS 
Now let us return to the consideration of the input to a decision-making 
process. In this process the decision maker receives information from various 
7 This assumption was made in earlier work (Giles [5]). It leads to a special case (homogeneous 
belief set) of the present treatment. 
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sources. We shall assume that each piece of information can be expressed in the 
form of an assertion. Its arrival is represented by the addition of this assertion to 
the belief set S of the decision maker, so that as information is received the belief 
set of the agent expands. Note that in this process the lower the payoff function 
of an incoming assertion the bigger its effect, i.e., the more important it is. 
Indeed, if a _< b then a IMPLIES b in the sense defined above, which clearly 
means a carries more information than b. We can express this by saying that 
the lower the payoff function of an assertion, the stronger the assertion is. 
EXAMPLE 5. As an example, consider again the case of the assertion of the 
manager of the insurance company (Example 2). Suppose that in reaching his 
decision, "Smith's application is acceptable," the manager considered among 
other things the doctor's report we discussed in Example 3, which was 
summarized in the assertion "Smith is healthy." In view of the subjective nature 
of utility, there is no procedure for combining assertions made by different 
speakers. So, although the information comes from the doctor, we must record 
rather the impression that it produces on the manager. To do this in terms of 
assertions, we can image that as a result of reading the doctor's report, the 
manager comes to rate the assertion "Smith is healthy" (for convenience, we 
take the same wording as before) as acceptable to himself; in other words, he is 
now willing to make this assertion. We ask now, by what payoff function is this 
assertion of  his to be represented? 
A simple answer is obtained if we assume that the relation between the 
manager and the doctor is the purely financial one described in Example 3: The 
doctor receives his fee but is liable to be sued if the outcome indicates gross 
incompetence. In this case we claim: The strongest assertion that can be safely 
made by the manager has, in dollar terms, the same payof f  unction as that 
o f  the doctor. To see this, suppose that the manager makes--on the basis of the 
doctor's assertion, say a--an assertion b. It seems fair to suppose that the 
manager, as the recipient of the doctor's report, assumes responsibility for 
paying the doctor's fee and for recovering damages hould this be necessary. 
Then, whatever the eventual outcome ~0, he will have to pay to the doctor the 
sum a(w), which may be positive or negative. On the other hand, as a result of 
his own assertion, he will obtain a measure of satisfaction whose utility is b(~0); 
for instance, this might be offered to him as a bonus by the company. It follows 
that he can be sure of not losing if and only if b(~) > a(~0)for every outcome o~: 
i.e., iff b _> a. Since the strongest assertion he can make is the one with the 
lowest payoff function, it is given by b = a. 
This argument determines exactly how strong an assertion the manager can 
make if he has no confidence whatever in the ability of the doctor. Usually, 
however, he will have appointed a doctor that he respects, and he will have faith 
in the accuracy of the doctor's report--independently of the possibility of 
litigation. How, in this particular case, can he estimate the payoff function of an 
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assertion b that reflects his beliefs? Clearly, since the estimate depends on his 
personal opinion, it can only be obtained by introspection with reference to the 
definition of a payoff unction. So, to estimate b(w) he must ask himself: If the 
outcome turned out to be o~, how gratified (or distressed) would I feel if I had 
made assertion b compared with how I would feel if I had not made it? To obtain 
a result that can be compared with the payoff function for his other assertion, 
"Smith's application is acceptable" (see Example 2), we want the payoff to be 
expressed in "company dollars." Thus b(~0) is determined by the equation: 
(Satisfaction i  having made assertion b) 
= (satisfaction on hearing the company 
has made a profit of b(w) dollars) 
Although somewhat intangible, this method--based directly on the definition of 
payoff--determines the payoff function in principle exactly and in practice at 
least approximately. 
Fortunately, the payoff functions for the relevant assertions need not be 
explicitly determined in order to handle a decision-making problem. In practice, 
an agent has a sufficient intuitive understanding of the meanings of the assertions 
and can express his or her beliefs directly. We shall find, in fact, that they are 
expressed in terms of relations between payoff unctions. This will be discussed 
in detail in the next section. 
COMPOUND ASSERTIONS IN DECISION MAKING 
Implication 
If tackled irectly, the problem involved in reaching a"decision on the basis of 
given information i volves envisaging all possible outcomes and estimating their 
relative likelihood in light of the experience of the agent. To do this directly and 
in detail is exceedingly complicated. Therefore, in practice the process is 
simplified by adopting rules that embody the agent's experience. In simple cases 
the formation and implementation f such a rule takes place entirely subcon- 
sciously; it then amounts to the development and elicitation of a conditioned 
response. In the cases with which we will be concerned, however, the process 
proceeds at a conscious level. The rule then expresses a belief of the agent. Such 
a belief, if formulated, is expressed by a compound statement containing 
connectives. In fact, this is the essential way in which connectives occur in 
decision making. 
Any attempt to automate the decision-making process involves the expression 
of selected rules in some formal language, and the result, when implemented 
with suitable hardware, constitutes an expert system. Usually the language 
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employed is based on classical ogic, although fuzzy logic has also been used in 
this context--with, however, the difficulties mentioned in the introduction. We 
shall now see how some common types of rules can be expressed using the 
language and logic of assertions. 
We deal first with the most common and elementary type of rule occurring in 
expert systems, a type that we will call a simple implication. This can best be 
illustrated by an example. 
EXAMPLE 6. Suppose the manager of the insurance company (see Examples 2 
and 3) adopts the rule: 8 
If Smith is healthy 
then Smith's application is acceptable (1) 
If classical ogic were used, this rule would be expressed using the material 
conditional, i.e., in the form if c~ then/~ or c~ implies ~3, where a and j3 are the 
sentences "Smith is healthy" and "Smith's application is acceptable," 
respectively. In fact, this form is the most common way of expressing a belief in 
classical ogic. Its function in decision making (where we are concerned with 
beliefs) is best given by reading it as the statement 
If I come to believe c~ 
then I will believe ~ too (2) 
In comparison, other properties of the material conditional--for instance, that t~ 
implies/3 is true if a is false--are of little importance. (Some of them are quite 
paradoxical; see, for instance, Adams [11].) 
Now let us see how rule (2) can be expressed using the logic of assertions. If 
we introduce the assertions, a = "Smith is healthy" and b = "Smith's 
application is acceptable," then it takes the form 
If a is acceptable then b is acceptable too (3) 
which we will informally abbreviate as "a  implies b." 
The meaning of "implies" introduced here should not be confused with the 
semantic relation IMPLIES defined earlier. Using the example given there, the 
relation " 'John is a giant' IMPLIES 'John is tall' ",  holds by virtue of the 
meanings of  the words and hence is accepted by every agent. But rule (3) 
expresses a belief of the manager; it says that if the assertion "Smith is healthy" 
is in his belief set, then so is the assertion "Smith's application is acceptable"; 
this need not be true of another agent's belief set. 
Rule (3) still requires modification in one respect. As stated it is derived from 
s Here "Smith" should really be replaced by a variable denoting an arbitrary applicant. But to 
keep the argument concrete and to avoid introducing "assertional forms" (see Giles [3]), we will let 
it stand. 
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(2), which, coming from classical ogic, pays no attention to degree of belief. 
Now, it is clear that if a is believed to only a small degree then the degree of 
belief in b should also be small. In fact, it seems reasonable to understand the 
rule to say 
Degree of belief in b-> degree of belief in a (4) 
or something like that. 
Of course this makes sense only if we make clear what weight we associate 
with the assertions a = "Smith is healthy" and b = "Smith's application is 
acceptable." We have seen that the weight of b is proportional to the sum 
assured. For definiteness let us assume that b refers to an application with sum 
assured = $1000. Similarly, the degree of belief in the health check, which is 
represented by the weight of a, affects the maximum sum assured for which the 
check would be considered adequate. Let us assume for simplicity that a denotes 
the assertion "Smith is healthy" with a weight just sufficient (via the rule in 
question) to support an application for $1000 insurance. 
We are now ready to consider how the rule "a  implies b"--interpreted, say, 
in form (4)--can be represented strictly within the language of assertions. As a 
guide, observe that if we use classical ogic, then, as noted above, the manager's 
belief is represented by the sentence c~ implies/3; i.e., he believes the rule if and 
only if his belief set contains this sentence. To get something analogous in the 
case of the logic of assertions, we are led to seek an assertion that will represent 
the rule "a  implies b." 
Well, what is "a  implies b"? Surely, looking at the classical case, "a  implies 
b"  is the extra information that brings you to believe b if you already believe 
a. We want an assertion c that represents this extra information. Or better, 
recognizing that a low degree of belief in a implies b is hardly going to be 
enough to conclude b given a and we can perhaps only safely conclude b if we 
are sure that a implies b, we should perhaps seek an assertion c such that 
(belief in a) plus (perfect belief in c) ensures (belief in b) (5) 
Now, we claim, we can take c = b - a. In fact, with this choice we get, by 
convexity, for any belief set S, 
and in general, 
(a E Sandc  E S) = (1/2)b E S 
(a E Sand2c  E S) = (2/3)b E S 
(a E Sand3c  E S) = (3/4)b E S 
(a E Sand4c  E S) = (4/5)b C S 
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Since S is topologically closed, this means 
(a E Sandnc  ~ Sfora l ln>O)  = b E S (5') 
which gives (5). In fact, we can show in the same way that 
(ha @ S and nc ~ S for all n>0)  = )xb ~ S 
for every ~ in [0. 1]. From this it follows that, given perfect belief in c, 
degree of belief in b -> degree of belief in a 
In a similar way we can represent a requirement of the form 
degree of belief in b _> k(degree of belief in a) 
for any k > 0 by including in S all multiples of b - ka. 
These examples of implementations of rule (1) illustrate how the natural 
requirement that the strength of belief in the health check should be proportional 
to the value of the policy applied for is automatically satisfied. Consideration of 
other examples uggests that a requirement of this sort can be expected to apply 
to every ruie that has the form of a simple implication. We shall refer to such a 
rule as a simple implication with proportional weights, since in abstract terms 
the requirement is that the weight of the conclusion is proportional to the weight 
of the premise. 
The simplicity of the representation f a simple implication with proportional 
weights is very satisfying, but we will now see that there is another bonus as 
well. 
In practice rule (1) is too naive to be applied universally as a company 
procedure. It is reasonable that it should be applied automatically, perhaps by a 
junior executive, in cases when not too much is at stake, but in the case of a very 
large policy it is likely that the health check will be supplemented by other 
considerations. To see how this situation can be dealt with, let us take another 
example. 
EXAr~PLE 7. Suppose, as a variation of the last example, that the company 
has the following rule: 
For insurance in amount less than $100,000 a health 
check (of appropriate weight) suffices, but for (6) 
larger policies special treatment is required. 
We claim that this rule (or rather a "smoothed" form of it) can be represented 
in the logic of assertions by the simple requirement that the assertion 100c 
should belong to the belief structure S, where a, b, and c = b - a are as stated 
in Example 6. 
To justify the claim, observe that, by convexity, 
(a E S and 100c E S) = 0.99b E S 
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and, in general, 
(2a E Sand 100c E S) = 1.96b E S 
(5a E S and 100c E S) = 4.76b E S 
(100a E Sand 100c E S) = 50b E S 
(10,000a E Sand 100c @ S) = 99b E S 
100k 
(ka E Sand 100c @ S) ~ - - b  E S 
100+ k 
This shows that for policies much less than $100,000 we have a behavior 
almost exactly as before: A health assertion with weight only slightly greater 
than the policy value suffices to make the application acceptable, while for 
policies greater than $100,000 no certification of health, no matter how strongly 
asserted, is sufficient by itself to justify acceptance of the application. This 
establishes the claim. 
The above discussion shows that rule (6), although more complicated than (1) 
when expressed in common language, has in the logic of assertions an even 
simpler representation than that of (1) in that it requires only a single assertion 
instead of an infinite set. 
The observation is important, since it can be argued that almost every rule in 
practice is, like (6), what we will call a conditional rule in that it is implicitly, if 
not explicitly, accompanied by a condition that limits its use to situations where 
the stakes involved are not too high. This is true not only of sophisticated rules 
that are applied in management but also of simple habits of everyday life that are 
normally followed without conscious thought. For instance, I may have a habit of 
eating fish on Fridays, but other considerations are invoked if the decision 
becomes unusually important, perhaps because of a digestive upset. For the 
following we shall assume that the "condition" in a conditional rule operates o 
as to place an absolute upper bound on the degree of belief in the conclusion, for 
all applications of the rule. We shall call this upper bound the l imit o f  
applicability of the rule. 
To review this discussion let us describe the procedure for obtaining an 
assertion to represent any conditional rule that has the form of a simple 
implication with proportional weights. Let a and b be assertions representing the 
premise and conclusion of the rule. Let I be the limit of applicability: No degree 
of belief in a, no matter how strong, can allow b to be concluded with a degree 
of belief greater than 1. According to the rule, if ~, is much less than l, then a 
degree of belief ~, in b will be justified by a proportional degree of belief, say 
k~,, in a. This determines k. The conditional rule is then represented by the 
single assertion c = l(b - ka).  To see this, assume c E S. Then, for any ~, > 
0, if S contains k)~a, it also contains the weighted mean [l(k),a) + )~c]/(l + ~) 
= [hl/( l  + ~)]b, which is nearly hb for h ,~ l and tends to lb as ~, ---' ~ .  
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Conjunction 
We have just seen how the simplest ypes of rule invoked to solve a decision- 
making problem can be treated using the logic of assertions. Note the method 
that was used. We started with examples of the most common type of rule used 
in expert systems, the simple implication. We expressed these rules in terms of 
assertions, making use of the identification of utility with truth value. By 
studying the examples we found that a simple implication could be expressed by 
means of the connective - (minus); and that when this was done it was 
possible, and in fact easy, to represent also degrees of belief and limits of 
applicability using this connective. 9 Thus this very simple connective provides 
richer powers of expression than are available in either classical or fuzzy logic, 
and indeed more than is usually incorporated, even in ad hoc manner, in an 
expert system. 
Now we shall discuss in a similar way a more general type of rule that 
involves the connective conjunction and find how it can be represented in the 
new logic. First, however, let us look at the obvious candidate for representing 
conjunction. 
In classical logic, conjunction is represented (as an action on truth functions) 
by the operation/x (min). This operation is characterized, and in fact uniquely 
determined, by the properties that for any sentences a and/3 and any belief set S, 
( i ) I f  o~ A /3 E S then o~ E S and/3 E S. 
(ii)Ifo~ @ Sand/3  E S thenc~A/3  E S. 
Let us see how this carries over to the logic of assertions. 
Let ot and b be assertions. Then a A b is defined pointwise on fi, and we might 
hope that the analog of (i) and (ii) would hold, namely, 
( i ' ) I faA  b E S thena  E Sandb E S. 
(ii ')Ifa E bandb E S then(aA b) E S. 
In fact, by the definition of a belief set, ( i ' )  does hold, since (a/x b) _< a and 
(a A b) _< b. But ( i i ' )  need not hold. For example, suppose a coin is to be 
flipped, and a and b are assertions of the form "the coin will show heads" and 
"the coin will show tai ls,"  respectively. Suppose that the payoff is in each case 
$2 if the statement proves correct and - $1 if it proves wrong. Then both a and b 
will belong to the belief set S of any reasonable agent, since he will expect to 
gain on average $0.50 by an assertion of either. However, a/x b will not lie in S, 
for by definition the payoff for a A b is - $1 whichever side of the coin comes 
up, so that an assertion of a A b will surely result in a loss. 
9 Compare this method with what is done in applications of fuzzy logic. There, the standard 
procedure is first to guess analogs for the connectives ofclassical logic and then try to apply them 
and see what happens. Because of this ad hoc approach, the method provides no principles for 
deciding how to assign or interpret intermediate truth values, possibilities, and so on, in practical 
problems. 
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The example clearly shows why (ii ') does not hold: A normal person 
considers an assertion to be acceptable if he has a reasonable expectation of gain 
_> 0; he does not require that the payoff should be > 0 for every outcome. [It is 
possible to postulate a narrow-minded type of agent who does insist on this latter 
requirement, in this sense refusing to take any risk. For such an agent (ii ') does 
hold. Agents of this type can be called classical agents (Giles [3]), since in a 
certain sense classical ogic suffices to handle their beliefs.] 
Now let us return to the consideration of the second type of rule tl~t arises in 
decision-making problems. Once more we start by considering an example. 
EXAMPLE 8. Consider again the situation discussed in Example 6, but now 
suppose that the manager of the insurance company adopts the more complicated 
rule 
If Smith is healthy and has healthy parents 
then Smith's application is acceptable 
In classical logic this rule would be written in the form (a and a ' )  implies/3, 
where et, c~', and/3 are the sentences "Smith is healthy," "Smith has healthy 
parents," and "Smith's application is acceptable," respectively. Let us call such 
an implication, in which the premise is a conjunction, acompound implication. 
Rules of this type form the second most common kind of rule occurring in expert 
systems; many occur, for instance, in MYCIN (Shortliffe [12]). 
How can we represent a compound implication in the logic of assertions? To 
answer this, let us continue with the example. Let a a ' ,  and b be assertions of 
"Smith is healthy," "Smith has healthy parents," and "Smith's application is 
acceptable," respectively. The rule now takes the form 
If a is acceptable and a '  is acceptable 
then b is acceptable too (7) 
[see rule (3)]. In other words, for any belief set S, 
I fa  E Sanda '  E S thenb E S (7')  
which we shall write briefly as "(a and a') implies b." 
How can we represent this statement directly by means of assertions? Well, if 
(ii') held, then (7') could be replaced by " i f  a/x a '  E S then b E S," which 
could then be treated in the same way as a simple implication. The fact that (ii ') 
does not hold means that we cannot make use of the connective/x in this way. 
Instead, we follow the same procedure as for a simple implication. In view of 
(7), we can describe "(a and a') implies b" as the extra information that 
would bring an agent o believe b if he already believed a and a'. As before, 
this leads to the problem: Seek an assertion c such that 
(belief in a) plus (belief in a ' )  
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plus (perfect belief in c) 
ensures (belief in b) (8) 
A possible solution is suggested by analogy with the previous case. Let us try 
putting c = b - a - a ' .  Suppose that S contains a, a ' ,  and kc, where ~ is a 
positive number. Then, by convexity, it also contains (kc + ha + ~,a')/(1 + 
2k) = kb/(1 + 2X). If this applies for all X, then, by closure, b/2 E S. Thus 
the rule is represented, at least in a slightly modified form, by the requirement 
that hc E S for all ~, _> 0, or equivalently that kc E S for arbitrarily large values 
of k. In either form, this requirement expresses perfect belief in c. 
Why b/2  and not b? Well, the conclusion, b/2  E S, may be expressed by 
saying that the agent's degree of belief in b is at least 1/2. This seems reasonable 
enough, since his degrees of belief in a and a '  are perhaps no more than 1, and 
the doubts he has in these assertions presumably both contribute to his doubt 
regarding b. 
We can see more clearly what is going on if we introduce a quantitative 
measure of doubt. Let us define the doubt, dt(a), that an agent has in an 
assertion a to be the reciprocal of his degree of belief in a (see the end of the 
section on belief sets). That is, 
dt(a) = 1/(degree of belief in a )= inf{k : a/k  E S, k>0} 
Note that perfect belief in a then corresponds to dt(a) = 0. It turns out that, 
because S is convex, the function dt( ) has very simple properties, l° In 
particular, it is sublinear: I f  an assertion a0 is a linear combination, a0 = kla~ + 
• "" + khan, with nonnegative coefficients k~, . . . ,  kn, of assertions al, . " ,  an, 
then 
dt(a0)<kz dt(al )+ " "  +kn dt(a~) (9) 
As an illustration, in Example 8 we have b = c + a + a ' ,  which gives, by 
(9), dt(b) < dt(c) + dt(a) + dt(a').  Since dt(a) __< 1 and dt(a')  < 1 (because a
and a '  are in S) and dt(c) = 0 (because the agent has perfect belief in c), this 
gives dt(b) _< 2. Since doubt = 1/belief, this is the same result as before. 
With c = b - a - a ' ,  the assumption of perfect belief in c means that 
dt(b)_< dt(a) + dt (a ' )  (10) 
i.e., the max imum doubt  in b cannot exceed the sum o f  the doubts in a and 
a ' .  (The statement in italics, relating one's feelings about a, a ' ,  and b, describes 
what is meant by perfect belief in b - a - a ' . )  Notice the significance of (10) 
with respect o Example 8. It means that a small increase in the doubt that the 
~0 In fact, this function is the Minkowski functional of the convex set S in the linear space of all 
assertions. See, e.g., Schaefer [13]. 
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agent has in the assertion a = "Smith is healthy" may be compensated by an 
equal decrease in his doubt in a '  = "Smith has healthy parents," leaving the 
conclusion "Smith's application is acceptable" believed as strongly as before. 
This illustrates two features of this representation f a compound implication in 
the logic of assertions: 
First, it is possible to represent this kind of compensation. This is important, 
for it is very common in practice that in the case of a compound implication a 
decrease in the strength of belief in one premise can be balanced by an increase 
in the strength of belief in another. Classical ogic is not adapted to express this 
sort of thing, but we see how very easily it is represented in the logic of 
assertions. 
Second, in Example 8 the two premises are treated as of equal importance. 
But it is clear that this does not necessarily represent the view of the decision 
maker. It is quite possible, for instance, that an increase in the manger's doubt in 
the assertion a = "Smith is healthy" would need, for compensation, a much 
greater decrease in his doubt in a '  = "Smith has healthy parents." This raises 
the question: How can we represent a rule of compound implication in which the 
premises are not of equal importance? 
The answer is very simple. Consider the assertion c = b - ha - /xa', where 
and/x are any positive numbers. Since b = c + ha + /za', we have, in the 
case of perfect belief in c, dt(b) _< h dt(a) + /~ dt(a').  So changes in the doubt 
attached to a and a '  now contribute differently (and arbitrarily) to the maximum 
doubt in b. In this way any relative importance of the assertions a, a ' ,  and b can 
be represented. 
Of course, the appropriate values of ~, and/~ depend on the weights attached to 
the assertions a, a ' ,  and b. These weights are not determined solely by the 
wording of the assertions but depend also on the emphasis with which they are 
expressed. There is thus no loss of generality in the fact that in Example 8 we 
assumed ;~ = /~ = 1; this merely represents an appropriate choice of the relative 
weights of the three assertions. 
Finally, just as in the case of a simple implication, we can represent a rule that 
is of the same form as rule (7) except that it is a conditional rule; i.e., it is 
accompanied by a condition that places a limit of applicability on the weight of 
assertion b. To see how this can be done it will be sufficient to consider an 
example. 
EXAMPLE 9. Consider a conditional rule of the same form as that in Example 
8: 
If Smith is healthy and has healthy parents 
then Smith's application is acceptable, 
provided the value of the policy applied for is less than $1,000,000 
We saw in Example 8 that the corresponding unconditional rule was 
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represented by incorporating in the belief set S of the manager assertions of the 
form k(b - a - a ' )  for an infinite set of values of k (including arbitrarily large 
values). We shall now see that the above conditional rule is represented in an 
even simpler way: by including in S the single assertion c' = 106(b - a - a ' ) .  
For if this assertion belongs to S, then dt(c') _< 1, which means, since b = 
10-6c + a + a ' ,  that 
dt(b)_< 10 -6 + dt(a) + dt(a')  (11) 
This, which is a modification of (10), represents the given rule, for (11) 
approximates to (10) if the degree of belief in a or in a '  is much less than 10 6, 
and gives a degree of belief in b that is always less than 106 and tends to 10 6 
when the degrees of belief in a and a '  increase indefinitely. 
It is clear from this example that even in the case of a compound implication a
conditional rule can be represented in the logic of assertions by a single assertion 
that is a homogeneous linear combination of the given assertions. 
Negation and Disjunction 
The semantics of classical logic and most nonclassical logics is determined in
the following way. Initially, the formal language is without meaning, while the 
meaning of the sentences and connectives of common language is taken to be 
relatively clear. Meanings are then assigned to the sentences and connectives in
the formal anguage through certain rules o f  translation into common language. 
In this way their meaning becomes, in principle, as clear as it is for common 
language. However, since the meaning of common language statements is often 
vague, depending on the context and the mental set of the listener, the result is 
not always satisfactory. 
In the logic of assertions, on the other hand, the position is reversed, at least 
for decision-making applications. In such applications we are concerned with 
meaning in the sense of pragmatism, i.e., in terms of operational significance. 
Now, the operational significance of sentences in common language is, as we 
have just noted, vague. On the other hand, the operational significance of an 
assertion is exactly determined (modulo the notions of decision theory), being 
given by the utility interpretation of the payoff unction. Thus the interpretation 
of assertions does not need to be defined; it is already determined. In particular, 
we can take any connective of the logic of assertions and discover its operational 
significance directly; we do not need to proceed via natural anguage at all. 
Afterwards, we can, if we wish, seek a natural language connective that 
corresponds more or less to the given connective--but this is a luxury that does 
not contribute to the specification of the meaning, although it may make the 
meaning easier to grasp. 
Bearing these thoughts in mind, let us consider how disjunction can occur in 
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a natural anguage rule for decision making. We have seen how conjunction can 
occur in the premise of a natural anguage implication rule and how rules of this 
type can be expressed in terms of assertions. The presence of a disjunction at the 
corresponding point raises no difficulty, for a rule of the form (a or a') implies 
b may be taken as shorthand for the pair of rules a implies b and a' implies b. 
Similarly, a simple implication with a conjunction in the conclusion is equivalent 
to a pair of simple implications. 
However, an implication with a disjunction in the conclusion, i.e., a rule of 
the form 
a implies (b or b ' )  (12) 
cannot be dealt with in this way. Now, in classical ogic the three forms 
c~ implies (/3 or/3') 
(a and not/3) implies/3' 
and 
(a and not/3') implies/3 
are equivalent for any sentences a , /3 , /3 ' .  A straight ranslation into assertions 
then suggests that the forms 
a implies (b or b') 
(a and not b) implies b' 
and 
(a and not b') implies b 
(a, b, b '  any assertions) should be equivalent, and using the translation for and 
and implies obtained in discussion of conjunction, this means that 
(b or b ' ) -a ,  b ' -a - (not  b), and b-a - (not  b') (13) 
should be equivalent. This suggests the rough correspondence (bor b') = b + 
b ' ,  and (not b) = - b; for (12) then gives 
(b+b ' ) -a ,  b' -a - ( -b ) ,  and b-a - ( -b ' )  (14) 
which are algebraically equal. 
It behooves us then to examine the meaning of the decision-making rules 
given by assertions of the form b + b '  - a. But first let us look at the unary 
connective - (negative). By definition, the payoff for - a for any outcome is 
the negative of the outcome for a. As an illustration, take the assertion a = 
"John is tall" of Example 1. The payoff functions for a and - a are sketched in 
Figure 5, and we see that it is quite reasonable to express - a in words as "John 
is not tall." 





a = " John  i s  ta l l "  
Figure 5. Graph of Payoff ~- ( = Utility to the Speaker) as a Function of Height of John 
for the assertions a = "John is tall" and -a .  
On the other hand, "not"  cannot always be translated so easily. In the context 
of Examples 3 and 4, if a is the assertion "Smith is healthy," than -a  
corresponds only poorly to the assertion "Smith is not healthy"; for instance, if
Smith is very sick the doctor who asserts "Smith is healthy" stands to pay heavy 
damages, while he who asserts "Smith is not healthy" will collect a relatively 
small fee. 
To summarize, the common language term "not"  corresponds roughly to the 
connective - (negative) of the logic of assertions. The correspondence fails to 
be exact, not because the latter connective is vague but because the meaning of 
"not"  (in terms of payoff) varies, depending on the context. Translation of 
"not"  from common language into the logic of assertions must be done with 
care, as in the examples above. 
It is now easy to describe the meaning of a rule whose specification i volves 
an assertion of the form c = b + b '  - a. We can use the equivalent form c = b 
- a - ( -b ' ) .  We saw in the section on conjunction that perfect belief in e 
leads, via b = c + a + ( -  b ' ) ,  to dt(b) _< dt(a) + dt ( -  b ' ) ,  which is a precise 
expression of "a  and not b' implies b". Similarly, inclusion in the belief set of 
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a single assertion of the form kc  represents a corresponding conditional rule. [Of 
course, an alternative interpretation is given by using the form c = b '  - a - 
( -b ) . ]  
It is only slightly more complicated to describe the meaning of a rule 
expressed by means of an assertion of the more elaborate form c = bl + • • • + 
b i -  al . . . . .  aj. 
FORMAL LOGIC  OF  ASSERT IONS 
To end this report I give a brief account of the structure and solution of a 
general decision-making problem. Any such problem is expressed in terms of a 
number of atomic  assert ions,  i .e., assertions, like a, a ' ,  and b in Example 8, 
that do not involve connectives. (In contrast, c in Example 8 is a compound 
assert ion. )  
Suppose that al, " " ,  an are the atomic assertions occurring in the problem. 
Let us assume that the decision-making policy to be used is expressed by means 
of a set of rules, in the sense explained above. Discussion in the previous ections 
suggests that a wide variety of rules can be expressed by means of one or more 
statements of the form a E S, where S is the agent's belief set and a = kta~ + 
• • • + khan is a linear combination of the atomic assertions; we will assume that 
all the rules involved are of this type. 
In addition to the rules, the agent will generally have a certain amount of data 
representing his beliefs (if any) concerning the atomic assertions. Each piece of 
data is given by a stated egree of belief k is some atomic assertion and so can be 
written in the form kai E S, for some i. Note that this is a special case of the 
general form that expresses a rule. 
Thus every piece of information available to the agent is of the form bi E S, 
where bi = ki~a~ + • • • + kinan in a linear combination of the a[s.  In addition, 
we have ~ E S. For convenience put b0 = ~. Let I" = { bi: 0 _ i _< m } be the 
set of all the assertions that are thus given as belonging to S; we assume, for 
simplicity, that I' is finite, i1 
A typical query, to be settled by the decision maker, is of the form: In these 
circumstances, how strong a belief should be attached to a particular assertion c? 
(Usually c is one of the atomic assertions, but this need not be the case.) 
In practice the answer may depend on the particular truth functions that 
represent the atomic assertions. For example, suppose a~ = "John is a giant" 
and a2 = "John is tal l"  (see under "Logic  for Decision-Making").  Then, if 
there are no rules and the only piece of data is al (so r = { a~ }), then we can still 
H The case of infinite I', which already arises if any rule is an expression of perfect belief, is 
discussed elsewhere by Giles [3]. 
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conclude a2 E S, owing to the semantic properties of the sentences al and a2-- 
properties that derive from the implicit connection between the meanings of 
"giant" and "tal l ."  For a mathematical treatment, however, it is necessary to 
make all such connections explicit by embodying them in appropriate rules. (In 
this case, for instance, we could do so by introducing a rule that expresses 
perfect belief in az - a~.) When this has been done (which we henceforth 
assume), the problem has been brought into the domain of formal logic. 
Formal logic is concerned with those conclusions that hold whatever  the 
truth funct ions  o f  the atomic  assertions (or sentences) may be. Classical 
logic, for example, is a particular type of formal logic; it is concerned only with 
those arguments whose validity is independent of the truth values of the atomic 
sentences. An illustration in the case of the logic of assertions occurred in 
Example 7. With the atomic assertions al = "Smith is healthy" and a2 = 
"Smith's application is acceptable," and starting from the data 5a~ E S and the 
rule given by 100(a2 - al) E S, we reached (inter alia) the conclusion 4.76a2 E 
S. Since this result depends only on the convexity of the belief set, it applies for 
every belief set S and whatever the truth functions of a~ and a2 may be. We say 
the assertion 4.76a2 is a semant ic  consequence of the pair of assertions {15a~, 
100(a2 - al)}, and write {5al, 100(a2 - al)} ~ 4.76a2. 
In general, c is a semant ic  consequence of F, written F ~ c, iff c E S for 
every belief set S that contains F. Using this notion, our query can be expressed 
in the form 
Find the greatest number k such that F ~ kc (15) 
For by assumption the agent's belief set S contains F; it therefore contains kc but 
not necessarily any larger multiple of c, and this means that the agent's degree of 
belief in c is at least k. (It might be more, but not for reasons of formal logic.) 
How is this maximum to be determined? The problem can be pictured 
geometrically. Let us identify each assertion a = klal + "'" + k .a .  with the 
point (kl, " " ,  k . )  in the vector space II. = ~t n, where ~ denotes the real 
numbers. F then becomes a set in I/".. Moreover, being convex, every belief set 
that contains F also contains the closed convex hull, b-6(F), o fF ;  in fact, b--6(F) 
can be described (here) as the smal lest  bel ief  set containing F. 
Our query can now be written: 
What is the largest k such that kc E U6(F)? (16) 
or, since ~-6(F) is the set of all convex combinations (weighted means) of the 
bi's, 
Maximize k subject o kc = Xj bj + • • • + ~kmbm, 
with 0<hi_< 1 for all i, and ~1 + " " " +Xm= 1 (17) 
Written in terms of components and setting c = a~ for simplicity, (17) 
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becomes 
Maximize k subject o k = Xl kjl + • • • + ~kmkrn ! 
0 = Xlkl2 + " " " + ~kmkm2 
0 = Xlkln + " " • + Xmkm~ 
with 0<Xi< 1 for all i, and Xi+ . "  +Xm= 1 (18) 
This is a problem in linear programming. Many methods are available for 
solving such problems; one is of particular interest in the present context. For 
simplicity we continue to assume that c = al. I first describe the method and 
then explain its rationale. 
By (16) it will be sufficient if we find all values of k for which kc can be 
expressed as a convex combination of the assertions bi = kilal + "'" + 
ki, an(O < i < m)  that compose 1'. This is done by repeatedly eliminating 
variables by an operation that will be called resolution. To simplify the 
description I introduce some terminology. If a = kla~ + • • • + khan is any 
assertion, we call ki the coeff ic ient o f  ai in a, and if k~ = 0 we say a is 
independent o f  ai. Now suppose b and b '  are assertions in which the 
coefficients of a~ are nonzero and opposite in sign. Then the resolvent o f  b and 
b'  with respect o the atomic assertion ai (or "on ai"), denoted R(b, b ' ;  ai), is 
the (unique) weighted mean of b and b '  that is independent of ai; otherwise it is 
undefined. 
It is clear by convexity that if1' ~ b and 1 ~ ~ b' then also 1' ~ R(b, b ' ;  a~) 
(for any assertion b, b ' ,  any atomic assertion a~, and any set of assertions 1'). 
Thus resolution acts here as a sound rule o f  inference for the logic of 
assertions. We shall see that, conversely, the process of resolution is itself 
sufficient o solve every query of the above type; in other words, a deductive 
system based on resolution alone is not only sound but complete. 
By the resolvent set o f f  along ai, denoted 6/(1"; ai), we mean the set of all 
resolvents on ai that can be formed from a pair of assertions in 1", together with 
any assertions in I '  that are already independent of ai. Clearly, 61(1"; ai) is a 
finite set of assertions, all independent of a~. Now form the sequence of sets 
1"n-l = 61(1"; an), 1"n-2 = 61(1"n-1; an-l), " ' ' ,  Ft = 61(1"2; a2). All these sets 
are finite, and for each i in { 1, • •. ,  n } the assertions in 1'~ are independent of all 
the aj's withj  > i. In particular, every element of 1'1 is simply a multiple of al. 
Let I = [k~i,, k~ax] be the smallest interval that contains the set (k: kal E I'1, k 
E ~}.  Then we claim 
For every real number k, kal is a weighted mean of 
the assertions in 1" if and only if kmi.-< k < kmax (19) 
In particular, the solution to (15) is k = km~x. 
Before proving the claim I illustrate the method by a simple example. Suppose 
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there are three atomic assertions a, b, c, and three rules and one fact are given, 
as follows: 
a-b -c  E S (o0 ! 
I 
3a+b+3c E S (/3)~ 3 rules 
/ 
a+ 2b-c  E S (3').1 
2c E S (~5) } 1 fact 
Suppose we want to find the degree of belief in a. First, use resolution to 
eliminate b in all possible ways: 
(a +/3)/2 2a + c E S (e) 
(2o~ + 3')/3 a - c E S (¢) 
Next, from the assertions that do not contain b, eliminate c in all possible ways: 
(e + 4~)/2 (3/2)a E S (~b) 
(6 + 2¢)/3 (2/3)a E S (0) 
We conclude that both (3/2)a and (2/3)a belong to S, so the degree of belief in a 
is > 3/2. This is the strongest conclusion that follows logically from the data and 
rules. 
The way the claim is proved can be described in geometrical terms. Let Vi be 
the/-dimensional subspace of V consisting of all assertions that are independent 
ofaj forevery j  > i. Then V~ __q_ I/2 c . . .  V, = V. Now it is clear thatF,_i c 
b--6(F) n v,_ 1; but we can actually show that Fn-~ contains all the extreme 
points of U6(F) n v,_ 1, so that U6(F~_ 1) = U6(F) n v,_ 1. Similarly, 
n Vn_2. " "  ". n v, 
Using these equations we easily get [kmin, kmax) = c-6(rl) . . . . .  c-o(r) (7 /71, 
which proves the claim. 
In this way we see that the operation of resolution provides a sound and 
complete deductive method for the logic of assertions. Of course, any general 
procedure for solving linear programming problems can be regarded as 
determining such a deductive method. I have described this one in particular 
because of its simple geometrical significance and because it provides an 
intriguing bridge between what would appear to be unconnected subjects--logic 
programming and linear programming. On the one hand, the process of 
resolution defined here--characterized as it is by the elimination of a single 
logical variable between two assertions--closely resembles the operation of 
(ground) resolution used in logic programming (see Loveland [14]) (hence the 
choice of the term); on the other hand, this same process is essentially the basic 
operation of Fourier's method (see Williams [15]) for solving linear program- 
ming problems. 
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